

















This article shows how the proper question to answer concerning consciousness is not ‘how 
consciousness arises in matter’, but how consciousness is part and parcel of the evolution 
of animate forms. The article traces out just such an evolution by consideration of real 
life forms including bacteria and invertebrates. It vindicates the evolutionary thesis that 
external proprioceptive organs, as evidenced in their own right, were modified and interna-
lized over time into kinesthetic organs, sustaining, in effect, a directly movement-sensitive 
corporeal consciousness across virtually all forms of evolutionary life. The paper specifies 
significant consequences of the thesis having to do with the unconscious, with present-day 
focal studies of the brain that neglect a correlative natural history, and with the need to at-










This	 article	 is	 based	 on	 but	 also	 extends	 an	
earlier	 article	 by	 the	 same	 title	 published	 in	




“Cerebral	 Organization	 and	 the	 Conscious	
Control	of	Action”,	in:	John	C.	Eccles	(ed.),	
Brain and Conscious Experience,	 Springer-
Verlag,	New	York	1966,	pp.	442–445;	quote	


































































inorganic.	He	 insists	 that	“living	systems”	differ	 from	“nonliving	systems”	
“only	by	degrees”:	“There	is	no	metaphysical	gap	to	be	bridged”	–	or,	as	he	
later	says,	applying	“the	same	lesson”	–	a	difference	“only	by	degrees”	–	to	
intelligence:	 “No	 metaphysical	 discontinuities	 emerge	 here”.7	 Churchland	
does	not	show	his	“lesson	 in	continuities”	 to	be	 true,	not	even	 through	his	
“lesson”	in	how	to	forge	definitions	of	life	that	will	be	opaque	to	discontinui-
ties,	such	as	claiming	that	“the	glowing	teardrop	of	a	candle	flame…	may	just	


















Bradford	 Books,	 Cambridge	 (MA)	 1984.	
Churchland’s	opening	sentence	of	the	first	sec-
tion	(“Neuroanatomy:	The	Evolutionary	Back-






Dennett,	 Consciousness Explained,	 Little,	





causes…	The	explanation	 for	 this	 is	 simple.	
There	was	nothing	that	had	interests.	But	after	












At	 least	 one	 consequence	 of	 the	 blurring	
should	be	singled	out	in	order	to	demonstrate	
the	 questionable	 propriety	 of	 claiming	 that	
“No	 metaphysical	 discontinuities	 emerge	
here”.	 A	 continuous	 metaphysics	 creates	
a	 problem	 for	 distinguishing	 in	 traditional	
Western	ways	between	life	and	death.	How-
ever	 rationally	 doubtful,	 quasi-eternal	 life	
(‘quasi’	 insofar	 as	 eternal	 life	 is	 punctuated	
from	 time	 to	 time	but	not	wholly	discontin-
ued)	 suddenly	 emerges	 on	 the	 smudgy	 face	
of	things	as	a	viable	metaphysical	future	pos-
sibility-if	 only	 materialist	 philosophers	 can	








Western	 burial	 practices	 in	which	 dead	 per-
sons	 are	 interred	 along	with	 items	 they	will	
need	in	their	ongoing	journeys.	With	respect	













































“Plant	seedlings	bend	 toward	 the	 light;	mealworms	congregate	 in	dampness;	cats	pounce	on	
small	moving	objects;	even	certain	bacteria	move	toward	or	away	from	particular	chemicals…	
[T]he	capacity	to	respond	is	a	fundamental	and	almost	universal	characteristic	of	life.”15
Oddly	 enough,	 this	 “fundamental	 and	 almost	 universal”	 dimension	 of	 life	
does	 not	 typically	 figure	 in	 definitions	 of	 life	 offered	 by	 philosophers	 of	





or	 ‘conscious’	apply.	What	basically	matters,	however,	 is	not	who	 is	doing	
the	pouncing	but	 the	ability	 to	provide	a	wholly	unprejudiced	rationale	for	
the	common	textual	practice	of	making	cognitive	distinctions	diacritically	in	
















































ganic	 and	 the	 inorganic	 since	organic	 forms	
are	 comparatively	 more	 closely	 related	 to	
each	other	 than	 they	are	 to	 the	 inorganic.	 In	
effect,	 to	 be	 consistent	 with	 Churchland’s	
theory,	 common	 textual	 practice	 should	 be	
altered.	Quotation	marks	 typically	surround-





metaphysical	 blurring	 on	 behalf	 of	 an	 unre-
lenting	 materialism-whether	 one	 finds	 the	
latter	 credible	 or	 not-forces	 an	 examination	
and	justification	of	common	textual	practice.	
It	clearly	calls	our	attention	to	a	fundamental	
question	 about	 where	 and	 on	 what	 grounds	
cognitive	 lines	are	diacritically	drawn	 in	or-
der	to	distinguish	among	capacities	of	various	
forms	of	organic	 life.	All	 the	same,	 it	 is	 im-
portant	to	emphasize	that	we	are	not	charged	
with	the	task	of	making	distinctions	in	mate-
rial	 complexity,	 thus	with	 the	 task	of	 taking	
neuron	counts	and	the	 like.	On	the	contrary,	
we	are	charged	with	the	task	of	understanding 





becomes	 in	 this	 instance	 and	 in	 a	 heuristic	







Charles	 Darwin,	 The Descent of Man and 









perhaps	 more	 marvellous	 than	 the	 brain	 of	























cognitively	 to	be	 animate.	 In	 a	 quite	 provocative	 sense,	 one	might	 say	 that	

























































































movement	 and	 position.	 It	 thus	 includes	 an	
awareness	of	movement	and	position	through	
tactility	as	well	as	kinesthesia,	that	is,	through	
external	 as	 well	 as	 internal	 sense	 organs,	
including	 also	 a	 sense	 of	 gravitational	 ori-
entation	 through	 vestibular	 sensory	 organs.	






























what	Dennett	 calls	 “maxims”.	Such	a	maxim,	 for	 example,	would	be	only	
the	beginning	of	an	 indefinitely	great	number	of	maxims	 that	a	 lobster	 (or	
any	other	so-called	“simpler	organism”)	could	be	said	to	carry	around	in	the	















ment	cannot	be	absolutely	programmed	such	 that	at	all	 times	 its	particular	
speed	 and	direction	of	movement,	 its	 every	 impulse	 and	 stirring,	 its	 every	
pause	and	stillness,	run	automatically	on	something	akin	to	a	lifetime	tape.	
Consider,	 for	example,	an	earthworm,	 its	body	pressed	against	 the	earth	as	
it	crawls	along,	or	a	beetle	walking	along	the	ground.	In	each	case,	the	im-
mediate	environment	is	tangibly	inconsistent;	it	has	topological	and	textural	


























of	 such	proprioceptors,	 consider	 that	 the	hunting	 spider	 (Cupiennius salei)	
26
Were	Dennett’s	 injunctions	 taken	 literally	at	
the	 letter,	 his	 agent-so-called-would	 have	 to	
have	 in	sight	at	all	 times	all	parts	of	his/her	
body	 in	 order	 to	 see	what	 they	were	 doing.	
Such	an	agent	could	in	no	way	build	up	prac-








Dennett	 is	 not	 alone	 either	 in	 his	 omission	
of	the	kinesthetic	or	in	his	privileging	of	the	
visual.	Typically,	kinesthesia	never	makes	an	









topic	 of	 body	 movement,	 if	 making	 an	 ap-
pearance	at	all,	typically	comes	on	the	scene	









sense,	 how	 we	 learned	 our	 bodies.	 More-
over,	 kinesthesia	 is	 fundamental	 not	 only	 to	
our	knowledge	of	“which	thing	in	the	world	















Cassirer,	An Essay on Man, Bantam	Books,	
New	York	1970,	p.	25.
30
M.	 S.	 Laverack,	 “External	 Proprioceptors”,	
in:	P.	J.	Mill	(ed.),	Structure and Function of 







See,	 for	 example,	B.	R.	Wright,	 “Limb	 and	
Wing	Receptors	 in	 Insects,	Chelicerates	and	
Myriapods”,	in:	P.	J.	Mill	(ed.),	Structure and 






















































sensilla	 of	 various	 kinds:	 hairs,	 exoskeletal	 plates,	 epidermal	 organs,	 cilia,	






















































in:	P.	J.	Mill	(ed.),	Structure and Function of Pro-
prioceptors in the Invertebrates,	pp.	443–483,	
p.	447.
37





water,	 then	 of	 course	 a	 polyp’s	 bending	 re-





































lated	by	proprioception	according	 to	 load.	Given	 the	difference	 in	animate	
form	between	a	gastropod	and	a	sedentary	polyp	–	which	difference	of	course	
means	a	difference	in	movement	possibilities	and	thus	in	behavioral	possibili-
ties44	–	 it	 is	not	surprising	 to	find	proprioceptive	capacities	 readily	evident	
in	the	one	and	not	in	the	other.	It	is	precisely	in	this	context	of	recognizing	
differences	 in	animate	form	that	 the	significance	of	both	the	affirmation	of	
proprioception	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 “true	 proprioception”	 becomes	 apparent:	
What	would	dispose	marine	biologists	to	affirm	“proprioceptive	units”	in	the	






































































relationship,	 see:	 S.	 M.	 Manton,	 “Locomo-
tory	Habits	 and	 the	Evolution	of	 the	Larger	
Arthropodan	Groups”,	in:	Evolution (Sympo-
sia of the Society for Experimental Biology, 





















from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 living	 organisms,	more	 appropriately	 specified	 as	 a	
form	of	tactile-reception.	The	protozoan	ciliate	species	Stentor,	for	example,	
uses	 its	 cilia	 to	 sweep	 away	noxious	 particles	 and	 the	Stentor	 itself	 bends	
away	from	the	tactile	disturbance.48	With	the	recognition	of	cilia	as	beginning	
specialized	sense	organs,	 the	notion	of	“true	proprioception”	is	definitively	



























A	 surface	 sensitivity	 subserving	movement	 becomes	 apparent	 the	moment	
one	looks	to	corporeal	matters	of	fact,	analyzes	them	in	sensory-kinetic	terms,	



















































stimulus	persists,	 the	Stentor	will	 reverse	 its	
cilia	 and	 try	 to	 sweep	 the	 particles	 away.	 If	
bending	 and	 sweeping	 are	 not	 successful,	 it	
contracts	and	waits.	Once	it	has	contracted,	it	
does	not	bend	or	sweep	again,	but	it	may	reach	
out	 to	sample	 the	water	several	 times	before	







logical Mechanisms in Animal Behaviour 
(Symposia of the Society for Experimental 
Biology),	vol.	IV,	Academic	Press,	Inc.,	New	
York	 1950,	 pp.	 34–59,	 p.	 35.	 –	 Quoted	 by	
P.	 J.	Mill,	 “Preface”,	 P.	 J.	Mill	 (ed.),	Struc-
ture and Function of Proprioceptors in the 
Invertebrates,	 pp.	 xvi-xviii,	 p.	 xvi.	 Lissman	













spect	 to	 the	 question	 of	 the	 relationship	 be-
tween	proprioception	and	learning:	“Because	
it	is	normally	impossible	to	eliminate	all	the	
proprioceptors	 and	 never	 quite	 certain	 that	
one	 has	 succeeded	 in	 eliminating	 all	 other	
sensory	cues,	it	is	rarely	possible	to	be	certain	
that	an	animal	 is	using	proprioceptive	 infor-
mation	when	 it	 learns…	One	must	 examine	
cases	 where	 animals	 learn	 in	 circumstances	







particular	 sorts	of	 animal	can	possibly	 learn	
from	 proprioceptive	 inputs	 in	 any	 circum-
stances	(since	that	question	is	unanswerable),	
but	 rather	 whether	 they	 normally	 appear	 to	
do	so.”	–	“Proprioception	and	Learning”,	in:	

































mobile	 forms	 of	 life	 and	with	 the	 same	 advantage:	 an	 internally-mediated	
corporeal	consciousness	of	movement	that	is	not	dependent	on	external	stimu-
li,	hence	on	tactility,	but	 that	 is	 internally	mediated.	This	kind	of	corporeal	
consciousness	is	not	only	relatively	protected	as	well	as	continuous	in	com-

































In diesem Artikel wird gezeigt, dass die angemessene Fragestellung bezüglich des Bewusstseins 
nicht darauf abzielt, wie sich Bewusstsein in der Materie niederschlägt, sondern auf die Art und 
Weise, in der das Bewusstsein als fester Bestandteil zur Evolution der Lebensformen gehört. Die 
Verfasserin zeichnet eine solche Evolution nach, indem sie reale Lebensformen einschließlich 
Bakterien und Wirbellose berücksichtigt, und vertritt die evolutionäre These, dass externe pro-
priozeptive Organe – wie anhand ihrer selbst nachgewiesen wurde – sich im Laufe der Zeit 
modifiziert und zu inneren kinästhetischen Organen gewandelt und so das motorisch-senso-
rische Körperbewusstsein während des Bestehens aller möglichen evolutionären Lebensformen 
aufrechterhalten haben. Ferner spezifiziert die Autorin bedeutende Konsequenzen ihrer These, 
die sich zum einen auf das Unbewusste beziehen, des Weiteren auf aktuelle Brennpunktstudien 
über das Gehirn, bei der die korrelative Naturgeschichte in Abrede gestellt wird, sowie auf das 
Bedürfnis, sich mit körperbezogenen Tatsachen zu befassen.
Schlüsselbegriffe
Lebensformen,	 Leben	 (Animation),	 Responsivität	 (Ansprechvermögen),	 propriozeptive	 Organe,	
Kinästhesie,	 körperliches	 Bewusstsein,	 oberflächliche	 Rekognitionssensitivität,	 kinetische	 Sponta-
nität,	„Erkenne	dich	selbst”	als	biologisch	eingebauter	Prozess
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
La conscience : une histoire naturelle
Résumé
L’article montre que la question appropriée en matière de conscience n’est pas « comment 
la conscience s’articule dans la matière » mais de quelle manière la conscience est-elle un 
élément de l’évolution des formes animées. L’article décrit justement cette évolution en exa-
minant des formes de vie réelles, y compris des bactéries et des invertébrés. Il donne raison à 
la thèse évolutionnaire selon laquelle les organes proprioceptifs externes, en tant que tels, se 
sont transformés et intériorisés au fil du temps en organes kinesthésiques tout en maintenant 
de fait une conscience corporelle du mouvement sensible à travers quasiment toutes les formes 
de l’évolution de la vie. Le texte précise les conséquences significatives de la thèse concernant 
l’inconscient, sur des études actuelles centrées sur le cerveau qui négligent l’histoire naturelle 











that	 the	 properties	 of	 all	 mechanoreceptors	
will	be	similar.	Variety	may	be	expected	as	a	
result	largely	of	anatomical	rather	than	physio-
logical	attributes.”
